Archive for December 2nd, 2013

December 2, 2013

Greenberg Named One of Best Mediation Lawyers in America 10th Year in a Row

For the tenth year in a row, Elayne Greenberg, Assistant Dean for Dispute Resolution Programs, Professor of Legal Practice, and Director of the Hugh L. Carey Center, has been named one of the Best Lawyers in America in the practice area of mediation.  Best Lawyers,  which compiles the annual list of top attorneys in various fields, is a peer-review publication in the legal profession that identifies outstanding attorneys through confidential peer-review surveys.

Professor Greenberg regularly shares her renowned expertise with students in and out of the classroom.  The New York State Unified Court System’s Office of ADR Programs recently approved under Part 146 her forty-two hour Divorce Mediation and Commercial Mediation courses.  Upon completion of each course, students will receive a certificate of participation that can help them satisfy the training requirements to serve as a mediator in court-connected mediation programs.

elayne

December 2, 2013

Cavanagh’s Publishes Article on Antitrust Law and Economic Theory

Professor Edward “Ned” Cavanagh has recently published an article in the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal entitled Antitrust Law and Economic Theory: Finding a Balance.  In the article, Professor Cavanagh argues that economic theory has taken precedence over facts in antitrust analysis in the courts and that a re-calibration is in order.  Here’s the abstract:

Over the past forty years, the federal courts have relied more and more on economic theory to inform their antitrust analyses. Economic theory has indeed provided guidance with respect to antitrust issues and assisted the courts in reaching rational outcomes. At the same time, infusion of economic evidence into antitrust cases has made these cases more complex, lengthier, more expensive to litigate, and less predictable. This Article argues that courts need to restore the balance between facts and economic theory in undertaking antitrust analysis. The problem is not that judges and juries cannot reach good outcomes in antitrust cases, but rather that courts have become too reliant on economic theory in deciding them. Just as courts of an earlier generation became too enamored of per se rules in antitrust cases, some courts today have become too enamored of economic theory in addressing and resolving antitrust issues. Some courts have lost sight of basic antitrust goals and have gotten bogged down in arcane
economic tests—relevant market and proof of common impact in class action cases are two examples—which have become obstacles to, instead of tools for, resolution of antitrust disputes. Antitrust is a body of law enacted by Congress and construed by the courts; it is not a compendium of the latest thinking in economic theory. The role of the courts is not to decree economic policy, but rather to implement antitrust policies enacted by Congress. Antitrust has always been a
fact-specific enterprise, and courts need to restore the proper balance between fact finding and economic theory by confining economic theory to those areas where it assists antitrust analysis and discarding such theory where it gets in the way. In short, courts need to return to simple, predictable, and administrable—but informed—antitrust rules.

Cavanagh_hores

%d bloggers like this: